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Abstract. Prohibiting the intertemporal trading of emission allowances induces positive risk premia in 
futures prices when the trading of the contracts and their expiry take place in time periods separated by 
this trading ban. In Phase I of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) these were in the order of 
about 28% of the futures price on average, depending on the contract’s expiry in Phase II. 
Environmental policy makers should avoid such restrictions as they result in increased hedging costs 
for polluters that are, since emission allowances represent opportunity costs, potentially borne by 
consumers. 
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1. Introduction 
The cost effectiveness of environmental policies based on cap-and-trade systems for emission 
allowances (or permits) is intimately related to the flexibility given to polluters with respect to the 
timing, extent and manner of emissions abatement (see Montgomery, 1972 and the review by Cropper 
and Oates, 1992). This flexibility is thought to be enhanced if the intertemporal trading of the permits 
is allowed (e.g., Rubin, 1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997). Contrary to the consensus view in the 
environmental economics literature however, the EU member states decided in 2003 to restrict 
flexibility by prohibiting the trading of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emission allowances from Phase I 
(2005-2007) to Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS (Directive 2003/87/EC). This was based on 
concerns that unless this policy was adopted, the achievement of the Kyoto obligations for the EU could 
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be jeopardized (see, for example, Parsons et al., 2009 for a discussion of this issue). Specifically, the 
rationale was that by not allowing the ‘banking’ of Phase I emission allowances to Phase II, a stricter 
cap would be essentially in place for Phase II. However, a simpler approach would have been to impose 
directly stricter caps in Phase II in order to account for any Phase I emission allowances banked. As 
expected, the decision attracted considerable criticism, with both academics and practitioners pointing 
out its negative implications from an environmental (Schleich et al., 2006), economic (Godal and 
Klaasen, 2006) and financial perspective (Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008). In response, the EU 
Commission started reviewing in 2006 the functioning of the EU ETS and adopted a year later several 
improvements regarding its operation from 2008 onwards. The main and most anticipated one was the 
removal of the inter-phase trading ban of the carbon permits (Directive 2009/29/EC). For a thorough 
description of the EU ETS, along with a discussion regarding the scheme’s operation during its first 
two phases see Daskalakis et al. (2011). 
The implications of the intertemporal trading ban in the EU ETS from a financial perspective 
have been extensively discussed in the extant literature (see Daskalakis et al., 2011, inter-alia). The 
focus, however, has been on the spot market, whereas little has been said on the consequences of this 
policy for the futures market. This is the issue I address in this note, with my objective being to provide 
environmental policy insights from the standpoint of the participants in the carbon futures market. Such 
insights are both topical and important as there are currently about 100 emissions trading schemes being 
planned (or considered) around the world after the ‘Paris Agreement’ for a worldwide effort to keep the 
global average temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius came into force in November 2016 (World 
Bank et al., 2016). Naturally, further than the establishment of a spot market, each of these schemes is 
expected to eventually develop a corresponding futures market so that, on the one hand, polluters are 
able to manage their carbon risk exposure and, on the other hand, speculators to enter the market, bring 
the necessary liquidity and in turn, improve market efficiency. The latter highlights the fact that the role 
of the carbon futures market is not limited to simply providing a hedging platform for polluters, but in 
fact is central in the success of an emissions trading scheme. The reason is that the achievement of the 
required emissions reductions in a cost-effective manner depends on whether the market itself is 
efficient and, therefore, the prices of the traded permits reflect their fundamentals (i.e., marginal 
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abatement costs), as only then polluters will be able to reach optimal abatement decisions (see 
Daskalakis, 2013 for a discussion). Consequently, when deciding the different aspects of an emissions 
trading scheme, policy makers need to have a clear understanding of the implications of their decisions 
for the futures market. Whether to allow the trading of the permits between different periods of the 
scheme is one of the first decisions to be made. Hence, the policy insights regarding this issue that can 
be drawn from the experience gained from the operation of the largest and oldest mandatory emissions 
trading scheme in the world, the EU ETS, are indeed invaluable. 
 
2. Relationship between spot and carbon futures prices: Background 
A main function of the EU ETS futures market is to provide a platform for polluters to hedge carbon 
price risk. To facilitate this, carbon futures (i.e., futures contracts with underlying carbon emission 
allowances) with expiry within not only the current but also the next phase of the scheme are traded. 
For example, in 2005 (beginning of Phase I) contracts with expiry up to December 2012 (end of Phase 
II) were available. Similarly, in 2008 (beginning of Phase II) futures with expiry up to December 2020 
(end of Phase III) were traded. Thus, carbon futures can be classified either as ‘intra-phase’ or ‘inter-
phase’ contracts. The former, are those that initiate and expire within the same phase of the scheme 
while, the latter, are those that initiate in one phase and expire within the next one. This categorization 
allows highlighting the key implication of the intertemporal trading ban for the carbon futures market. 
When the permits cannot be transferred from the current phase to the next, the spot emission allowances 
underlying the inter-phase futures are a different asset than the underlying spot permits of the intra-
phase contracts. More importantly, as the underlying of the inter-phase futures is not a traded asset in 
the current period, the spot-futures price relationship (or equivalently the pricing mechanism) between 
these two categories of contracts differs. 
To illustrate this, Figure 1 presents the daily price evolution of the spot permits and of the most 
liquid inter- and intra-phase carbon futures traded in Phase I of the EU ETS. Spot prices are from the 
French PowerNext, the primary spot carbon exchange in that period. Futures prices are for contracts 
with December expiry in the years 2006 to 2010 (Dec-06 to Dec-10 contracts) traded in the London-
based Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), the main carbon futures exchange in the EU ETS. For the 
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specification of the carbon futures and a description of the spot and futures exchanges in the two first 
phases of the EU ETS see Daskalakis et al. (2011). Based on the classification of the carbon futures 
introduced above, Dec-06 and Dec-07 were intra-phase contracts and the remaining three (Dec-08, Dec-
09 and Dec-10) inter-phase futures. The key observation from this figure is that although intra-phase 
futures prices followed very closely the price evolution of the spot permits, this was not the case for the 
inter-phase contracts. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Further insights are gained from Figure 2 that plots the prices of the three inter-phase futures in the 
period 2008 to 2010, that is, from the beginning of Phase II up to the expiry of the longest expiring 
contract (Dec-10). Spot prices from BlueNext (PowerNext was acquired by BlueNext in 2007) are also 
presented for comparison purposes. As seen in this figure, when the trading of the inter-phase futures 
was taking place in the same period as their expiry, their prices followed closely the prices of the spot 
permits, similarly to the case of the intra-phase futures in Phase I. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
For explaining this behavior, Daskalakis et al. (2009) argued that since storing the permits is costless, 
and there is no advantage of holding a long futures position in comparison to holding a long spot one, 
intra-phase futures prices should be related to spot prices through the cost-of-carry model of Kaldor 
(1939), Working (1948) and Telser (1958), with zero storage costs and no convenience yield. They 
further pointed out that this should also be the case for the inter-phase futures when their trading takes 
place in the same period as their expiry. Indeed, the empirical evidence they provided suggest that any 
mispricing of the cost-of-carry model in these two cases is in the order of the transaction costs. For the 
inter-phase futures when traded in a different period than their expiry however, they explained that 
since the underlying of these contracts is not at that point traded, the cost-of-carry model is no longer 
applicable. Instead, they proposed a futures pricing model based on an empirically consistent 
continuous-time process for the spot prices. 
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3. Risk premia in inter-phase carbon futures prices 
I revisit here the relationship between inter-phase futures and spot carbon prices when the trading of 
the contracts and their expiry take place in different time periods due to an intertemporal trading ban. 
In contrast to Daskalakis et al. (2009), I follow an approach that can be traced back to the classical 
hedging-pressure literature (e.g., Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939; Cootner, 1960; Hazuka, 1984), according 
to which, futures prices for non-storable assets consist of two parts: the expected spot price of the 
underlying at the contract’s expiry and a positive risk premium (see Daskalakis et al., 2015 for an 
application of this type of analysis on electricity futures prices). Assuming two types of investors, 
hedgers (risk averse investors) and speculators (less risk averse investors), this premium represents the 
compensation the latter require from the former for taking short positions and assuming spot price risk. 
Thus, the pricing relationship of a futures contract in this approach is given by: 
𝐹𝑡,𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑆𝑇) + 𝑅𝑃𝑡 (1) 
where, 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 is the price at time t of a futures contract expiring at time T, 𝐸𝑡(𝑆𝑇) is the expectation at 
time t for the spot price of the underlying at expiry, and 𝑅𝑃𝑡 is the risk premium at time t. Substituting 
the expectation by the observed spot price at the contract’s expiry we obtain the relationship of the so-
called ex-post (or realized) risk premium: 
𝑅𝑃𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 − 𝑆𝑇 (2) 
In the context of the EU ETS, polluters wishing to eliminate carbon price risk (hedgers) take 
long futures positions for securing at a pre-specified price the number of permits they estimate they will 
need in the future for attaining environmental compliance. The counterparties (speculators) are polluters 
who believe they will manage to abate emissions and, therefore, will have surplus permits which they 
sell in the futures market. When a trading ban of emission allowances from the current to the next phase 
of the scheme is in place, speculators face an increased risk of failing environmental compliance in the 
next phase and thus, having to pay the penalties set. This is because, on the one hand, the current traded 
spot permits cannot be transferred to the next phase and, on the other hand, information regarding the 
permit allocations for the next phase only become known at the end of the current one. Based on these 
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considerations, one would expect to find during Phase I of the EU ETS positive risk premia in the inter-
phase futures prices. 
To this end, I calculate through equation (2) the ex-post risk premia for the inter-phase futures 
Dec-08, Dec-09 and Dec-10 in Phase I. The daily evolution of these is depicted in Figure 3. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1. The results indicate that there were indeed significant positive, on 
average, risk premia in the prices of the three inter-phase futures in Phase I. Specifically, the mean 
premium was about €5, €6.5 and €7.3 per permit for the Dec-08, Dec-09 and Dec-10 contract 
respectively, with the increase along with time to expiry reflecting the time value of money effect. 
Expressing these as a ratio to the corresponding futures price, it seems that the risk premia accounted 
for a considerable proportion of the inter-phase futures prices. Specifically, they accounted for 
approximately 22% of the permit price on average in the case of the Dec-08 contract, 29% in the case 
of the Dec-09 futures and 33% for the Dec-10. Finally, although negative risk premia are found for all 
inter-phase futures, their number is rather limited: out of 624 daily risk premia computed for each 
contract, only 44 are negative for the Dec-08, 11 for the Dec-09 and 2 for the Dec-10. More importantly, 
these are clustered in a period during which: a) Phase I spot permits were trading for a few cents due to 
the combined effect of the generous emission caps provided in that phase and the inter-phase trading 
ban (see Parsons et al., 2009 for a discussion of this issue), b) Phase II permit allocations had not yet 
been determined, and c) the revisions of the EU ETS were still undergoing. A plausible explanation for 
these negative premia, therefore, can be based on market participants’ concerns that should the emission 
cap in Phase II was not set at an appropriate level, and the inter-phase trading ban removed, demand for 
Phase II spot permits would be virtually non-existent, similarly to the spot permits in the final year of 
Phase I. 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 1about here] 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
An intertemporal trading ban of emission allowances results in increased hedging costs for polluters. 
These come in the form of positive risk premia in futures prices when the trading of the contracts and 
their expiry take place in different time periods due to the ban. Since emission allowances represent 
 7 
opportunity costs for polluters, it can be expected these costs to, at least partly, pass-through to 
consumers. In fact, according to Sijm et al. (2006), the carbon cost pass-through rate in Europe varies 
between 60% and 100%. Therefore, the cost implication of an intertemporal trading ban of emission 
allowances for consumers can indeed be substantial. Hence, environmental policy makers should be 
aware that imposing temporal restrictions in emissions trading has significant cost implications for 
participants in the futures market and potentially for consumers. Consequently, imposing an 
intertemporal trading ban of emission allowances as a mechanism for setting stricter emission caps in 
future periods of an emissions trading scheme is a practice that should be avoided. 
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Figure 1. Emission allowance spot and futures prices in Phase I 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Emission allowance spot and futures prices in Phase II 
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Figure 3. Ex-post risk premia in inter-phase carbon futures prices 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of ex-post risk premia in inter-phase carbon futures prices 
Contract Mean Median Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
Dec-08 4.96 4.69 -3.16 16.84 3.50 
Dec-09 6.45 6.19 -1.56 18.54 3.46 
Dec-10 7.34 7.06 -0.60 19.65 3.43 
Note: Risk premia are expressed in €/emission allowance. 
